Wednesday, 18 April 2012

The New Atheism and Shrovetide Laughter


I am sure there is a Darwinian explanation for satire and I would be genuinely intrigued to know what it was.  I raise this as numerous commentators have noted the parallelism between the rather shrill and po-faced denunciations of religion and the dour, puritanical zeal of many Christian groups in their attacks on ‘secular humanists.’  If Charles Taylor is right, puritanical Darwinists and their religious opponents are indeed cousins, for both carry on the legacy of the Reformation in their zeal to re-make the world in their own image.  Both, however, would do well to contemplate the tradition of Shrovetide laughter or carnivalesque satire that used to be part of the cycle of Easter celebration.

Some recent social theory has focused on the phenomenon of the carnival.  Mikhail Bakhtin – the Russian literary critic – suggested that the carnival was a kind of proto-revolutionary upheaval, embodying flash-floods of democratic spirit.  He saw carnivals as popular demonstrations of dissent against the consecrated injustice and inequality of the feudal system. For a short period ordinary people were able to overcome inequality and defy their oppressors in both the church and the state.  For example, Peter Docker describes carnival thus:


'Images of inversion, world upside-down, topsy-turvy, vice versa, were features of banquet festivity as well as of carnival activity in general, symbolised in the king’s attributes being travestied in mock royalty; at nearly every popular banquet, especially in France, ephemeral kings and queens were elected.  Here again the Renaissance was continuing medieval tradition, with stories where the king bears children while the queen fights a war, a carnivalesque war, with cheeses, bake apples, and mushrooms.  Revellers wearing clothes turned inside out, trousers slipped over the head, symbolised the overturning of hierarchy, not only in terms of class and caste, but also of men and women, fathers and sons.'[1]

It is easy to see why this interpretation is appealing.  Lampooning the powerful is always fun and contemporary confessional Darwinists may well feel a kindred spirit with an earlier generation of those who mocked the church.  However, the assumption that this folk activity was separate from, indeed directed against the official church needs questioning. We cannot draw clear lines of separation between folk-ways and ‘official’ Christianity.  One only needs to look at the marginalia of bibles, the grotesque monsters on Cathedrals or under misericords to remind oneself that priests and peasants shared the same imaginative world.

Shrovetide laughter and carnival did mock Christian practice – turning it on its head – but they also depended for their comic effect on a shared scriptural and liturgical frame of reference.  Like any form of satire – whether it is Hogarth or Private Eye – the intention is moral and corrective not destructive: you mock the society or politician precisely because you value a good society and a just politician.  Commenting on the carnival inspired writings of Rabelais, M. A. Screech notes:


'It is in the spirit of carnival to laugh for a while at what is normally admired or awesome.  A great deal of laughter in Pantagruel is evoked against a normally revered scriptural background.  Rabelais’s writings show him as accepting Scripture as the normative and inspired word of God.  When less biblical ages fail to recognise either the normative scriptural illusions or the funny perversions of them, much of Rabelais’s humour and wisdom slips out of focus.'[2]

The same might be said of other carnivalesque writing, notably in the work of many of the founding fathers of European literature: Chaucer, Erasmus, Cervantes and Shakespeare.

There is also much evidence to suggest that the glee with which people entered into the carnival was equally matched by the devotion they lavished on lent and Easter. Moreover, we have to take account of the fact that carnivals on Shrovetide were sanctioned by the church.  In short, we must attend more closely to the theological and liturgical meaning of carnival.

The carnival was not so much anti-authority or anti-church as anti-idolatry.  There is a famous quip from Antiquity quoted by both Erasmus and Rabelais: king Antigonus the First was called a god by a flatterer.  He replied, ‘The Gentleman Bearer of the Chamber-pot denies it.’  By pointing to the shit of life the pretensions of power and the tendency of both church, state and academy to self-aggrandizement to the point of idolatry are shown for what they are: foolishness.  The Church sanctioned the carnival because it was a corrective mechanism, a form of critique: by humiliating the church it reminds the church not to take its own righteousness too seriously.  It serves a wider social purpose as well: dwelling on shit, sexual licence and folly helps us remember we are creatures subject to unruly desires and lusts in need of redemption.  However, to end there (as so much contemporary literature does from the likes of Will Self, Philip Roth, and Irivine Welsh), is to fall prey to a false pessimism.  It is to deny the possibility of the redemption of our bodies.  As Screech puts it: ‘Our natural exreta keep us in our place, as creatures; to accept them as natural is right and proper: to glory in them is subhuman and mad.’[3]  The carnivalesque is a laughter that mocks the madness of the world unredeemed.  Before we can truly enter into Lent and Easter it is vital we understand the nature of chaos and laugh at it, revel in it in order that we can make sense of lent and the true joy and celebratory laughter of the day of resurrection. 

Scatological humour is the most appropriate form of humour for this task because we should laugh at the wrong kind of transformation: degeneration or the turning of creation into shit.  Christian were to laugh, rather than weep at this precisely because it was not the ultimate truth.  We can deride it because it is not the eschatological transformation, the transfiguration of creation into its fulfilment, into an over-abundant new creation. 


The sanctioned use of carnival within the liturgical year should not blind us to how it contrasts with Easter.  If we just had Shrove Tuesday without Lent and Easter then we would miss the middle and end of the story.  It is important to remember that there is a shadow side to the carnival: at the heart of all forms of the carnivalesque is a twofold rejection.  First, carnival denies Christ’s affirmation of creation as good by contravening human limits (for example, through celebrating gluttony and excess) and over-turning the established social order (for example, by celebrating the abandonment of social ties). Second, carnival constitutes a rejection of the future given by God (for example, by celebrating immediate gratification and reward).  Bakhtin could well be right: carnivals can serve to disrupt an unjust social order.  However, the manner of this disruption is wholly different in kind from the eschatological disruption of the messianic feast. In contrast to the messianic banquet which enables generative, transfigured patterns of human social flourishing, the Saturnalia or carnival is degenerate: it is a picture of life unredeemed.  Necessarily, Shrovetide laughter is followed by the melancholy of Lent – that time when we come to terms with that in us and in others which is given over to death.  Then comes Easter – a time when even that which is most riddled with death can be given new life, redeemed, set free. 

Folk Christianity – which is deeply embodied, communal and riotous – is a great antidote to both the abstraction and over-serious demeanour of academic theology, the corruption of ecclesiastical institutions and the ascetic perfectionism of monasticism.  Moreover, the laughter of Shrovetide is a far more Christ-like way of dealing with that of which one disapproves: to laugh at the ignorance or foolishness of the heretic, the idolater or the autocratic bishop (or imperious Darwinist) is better than to anathematise or burn or kill them!  It is to be faithful to a gospel that is foolishness to those who take this world too seriously.

Carnival reminds us also that Christianity is no stoical religion.  Christ the glutton whose feasting mocks the misunderstanding of the Pharisees needs remembering every bit as much as Christ the suffering servant.  The Jesus who plays ludic games with loaves and fishes, who conjures up plenty amidst dearth, needs celebrating as much as the Christ who calls on the rich young ruler to see that true value does not reside in wealth and luxury.   In their dreams of cockaigne and their feasts of tripe filled with dung, medieval peasants were more faithful than their scholastic contemporaries to the incarnation.  As are contemporary Pentecostals and Charismatic Christians with their extraordinary acts of healing and their uproarious, ludicrous behaviour all of which is a wonderful mocking of the po-faced, puritanism of so much Christianity and we might add, Darwinianism, both of which have a tendency to take themselves far too seriously.




[1]  John Docker, Postmodernism and Popular Culture: A Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 178.
[2] M. A. Screech, Laughter at the Foot of the Cross (London: Penguin, 1997), pp. 230-31.
[3] Screech, Laughter at the Foot of the Cross, p 289.

Tuesday, 20 March 2012

Nationhoods and Neighbourhoods: Churches and the Response to the Far Right

Cheynegate Room, Westminster Abbey, 20.03.12 

“This country is a blessed nation. The British are special. The world knows it.  In our innermost thoughts, we know it. This is the greatest nation on earth.” [Tony Blair]


People in Britain should "celebrate what makes us a Christian nation" and "reclaim the symbols and emblems of our nation…”He urged Christians to have "robustness" in their national identity as well as their faith. [John Sentamu]

“Christian faith has been central to the emergence of our nation and its development…We have argued that it is necessary to understand where we have come from, to guide us to where we are going, and to bring us back when we wander too far from the path of national destiny.” [Michael Nazir-Ali]


“I’m an Anglican. By blood, by descent, by the way I was brought up, by my schooling and so on. I’m an Anglican, and really therefore I find myself without a church…The only people amongst the senior hierarchy of the Anglican church who are any use at all, are John Sentamu, and Bishop Ali Nazir (sic)... So I’m a Christian without a home.” When asked if he had ever made any kind of Christian commitment, [Griffin] says “I was married in an Anglican church, I regard Christian values as a good thing, in trying to live a decent life and sometimes failing… that’s as far as I think people of my kind of Christian origin do go.” [Nick Griffin]


I have been asked to come and say a few words on ‘responding to the far right’ and on the issue of Christianity, national identity and the idea of the Christian nation. As we see from the quotes above sometimes it is not easy to tell the ‘far right’ from the others when it comes to matters of Christianity and national identity.  This is because the language of the ‘Christian nation’, the ‘blessed nation’, the ‘nation with a destiny’ is so easily and so often co-opted by the BNP and others.

Obviously three of the four people quoted are not, and never will be, supporters of the BNP. Yet as much as I like to think of the mental gymnastics required to make Nick Griffin say something nice about Sentamu and Nazir-Ali, I do think it is no accident that he found their mindset so congenial to his cause.

How can they – and we – respond to the far right without being co-opted by the far right? One way, plainly, is to stop using ‘Christian nation’ language altogether. And this is my simple plea to Christians in the public eye today.

In times of stress and challenge – in the face of secularisation or the increasing presence of Islam say – it is tempting to bind the language and mindset of strong national identity to the language and mindset of Christianity.  But I think that ‘Christian nation’ language is precisely that – a temptation.

I want to sketch out for you now three ways that I think National Identity rhetoric and the ‘Christian Nation’ are temptations best avoided by Christians. 

The first way is that it is a temptation to cultural triumphalism, or, in other words, a temptation to confuse the gift with giver.

Now, by offering a critical assessment of Nazir-Ali I do not want to think of him as a straw man. In fact, he is an eloquent and intelligent writer and speaker. There are far more shrill and thoughtless proponents of ‘Christian nationhood’ out there who are not worth our time.  Nazir-Ali is worth our time because (a) he is a thoughtful Christian and (b) the BNP also thinks he is worth their time. But it seems that Nazir Ali (and others) has spent so much time thinking about how Christianity has shaped the nation that he has perhaps failed to see how the nation has shaped Christianity.

Historically, the reality of the ‘Christian nation’ often ends up benefiting the nation more than it does Christianity. Often proponents of the idea that ‘Britain is a Christian Nation’ are also the ones who will complain that when it comes to Christianity, the British population is largely apathetic, ignorant or in angry rejection.

Yet the two go hand in hand. The more Christianity becomes associated with the common culture, the more one will find large swathes of that population who think they already know what Christianity is (if they think about it at all); will think they are already Christians because they are born into the culture (and if so, so what?); or will angrily reject the Christianity they have met in their compulsory GCSE religious studies classes and school assemblies, or the civic religion they encounter in the formalities of parliament or the opening of town council meetings  – none of which bears much relevance or resemblance to their lives.

Something strange happens to Christianity when it becomes part of the furniture of a nation – it disappears. This is the phenomenon that the social critic Søren Kierkegaard was talking about when he claimed that Christendom had done away with Christianity. In his 19th c. Denmark Christianity had become so closely connected to the common culture that becoming a Christian was as easy as being born. At the same time there were scores of the population who thought they were Christian because they were Danish. In such a world, the trick was to make becoming a Christian harder, not easier. Hence Kierkegaard’s attack upon Christendom.

The ever over-quoted C.S. Lewis was less incendiary but no less acute when he described the Christian civilisation he grew up in with its educational system and formal prayers as an inoculation against meeting the real Christ of Christianity. Why would he need to become a Christian? Didn’t he already catch it as a matter of course when he was young and absorb it into his system like a small dose of the measles?

This, of course, is exactly the sort of Christianity that Griffin is affiliating with when he talks of being an Anglican by blood and descent.  And, frankly, is he not here expressing sentiments that many, many other British people would express if asked to articulate what Christianity meant to them? The solution to this confusion cannot be an increase in Christian nation rhetoric.

Commentator Stephen Tompkins has said how taking Christianity out of British culture is not like taking raisins out of a fruitcake – it is like taking the chocolate out of a chocolate cake. I think he is right.  The fact of the religion’s deep influence on the laws, language, geography and moral customs of this nation is beyond doubt.

Just look at this place (Westminster Abbey) – it is the landmark to which other landmarks in this city point. It is the symbol of Englishness and the English arrangement of Church and State. Whether they like it or not, no one, really, can disagree with the historical and cultural reality of Christianity in this country.

But herein precisely lies the temptation– as long as Christianity is primarily seen as a historical and cultural phenomenon, the essential crisis that Christ poses to individual people and their lives will remain suppressed. As a response to the far right who co-opts Christian culture language then, I would put the possibility of offense.

As long as a christianised population is protected from having to face the short sharp shock that this man is God - or indeed that God is this man - then they cannot be said to have encountered what is essential for Christianity. Christian faith is not about being part of a culture, or speaking English or being a decent member of society. It is much more something like having to face the man who says ‘come unto me and I will give you rest’ and choosing not to be offended.

For example, Christianly the success of this church (Westminster) and those who work here is not measured by how well it acts as a cultural repository for all things British, it is measured by how well it stands as a continual catalyst for people to be faced with the unsettling nature of who Jesus Christ is. The success of Christian culture (and I do think, like chocolate cake, it is a success in many ways) has flowed as a secondary effect from such people who did face the possibility of offence posed by the incarnation and chose not to be offended.  By resisting the temptation to cultural triumphalism, we resist the temptation to confuse the gifts with the giver.

A second way one can see trying to hitch Christianity to ‘the nation’ as a temptation is that National Identity rhetoric poses the temptation to replace complex reality with simplistic identity.

Here is a quote from the BNP manifesto: We want Britain to remain – or return to – the way it has traditionally been. We … have no problem with [ethnic minorities] as long as they remain minorities and do not change nor seek to change the fundamental culture and identity of the indigenous peoples of the British Isles.”

And here is Nick Griffin again: “All the nations of the world need to develop an immunity to the culturally and ethnically genocidal melting pot 'vision' on offer from Hollywood, the global corporate elite and their left-wing Useful Idiots... As with all indigenous peoples, the people of Britain have an absolute right to retain their identity and to be themselves.”

What I wish to highlight here is the absolute certainty that nationalists have that ‘national identity’ is a thing which is easy to identify, easy to lose, and, indeed, relatively easy to preserve if only we had the will.

This assumption is by no means confined to the far right. David Cameron has said that he thinks “a sense of national identity helps foster social cohesion.” “Patriotism,” he says, “transcend politics… its value is [a] unifying, not a divisive force.” For Gordon Brown “A strong sense of being British helps unite and unify us; it builds stronger social cohesion among communities.  We know that other countries have a strong sense of national purpose, even a sense of their own destiny.  And so should we.”

The language of National Identity holds out the promise of concrete ways to talk about personal identity and a stable place from which to pursue one’s group destiny.  

It offers the promise of social cohesion and stability. Nothing is more obvious, or essential, or common sense than one’s national identity, runs the logic, therefore this is a prime base for looking at the world and our collective role in it.
This is attractive to Christians who also like to talk about cohesion, community, order and vision and see them as part of their mission. I have already quoted Nazir-Ali when he argues that the Christian aspect of British Identity is “necessary to understand where we have come from, to guide us to where we are going, and to bring us back when we wander too far from the path of national destiny.” Behind Nazir-Ali’s ‘Christian nation’ lies an ‘Orders of Creation’ theology (evident, for example in his essay ‘Breaking Faith with Britain”).

This is a theology that sees humankind as inhabiting an ordered world. The social forms of human life are said to be patterns set by the Creator – gifts of grace given to creation to provide stability for human identity and endeavours. Nations and national identity are said to be very much part of this created order. The nation is the ordered context into which individuals are born and grow, live and die. The way they discharge their duties to God is shaped by their nation, which gives them a home and a language, a community and a purpose. This theology also has amongst its proponents Martin Luther, Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer to name but a few, and here today in the UK, Nigel Biggar and Joan and Oliver O’Donovan.  So it is not a system of Christian thought to be dismissed lightly.

But I do here suggest a pause for thought.  When Christians talk about nations as part of the concentric circles of the created order, they tend to do so without much engagement with the socio-political and historical reality of what a ‘nation’ actually is. One could be forgiven when reading these commentators for thinking that ‘National Identity’ is a brute fact, and that ‘nations’ are a feature of the natural environment, easily distinguishable one from the other.

Nations and their attendant Identities certainly exist. But they do not exist in the way that, say, a mountain or a river exists. Instead, their existence is more like that of a narrative or a story. To follow the sociologist Benedict Anderson’s well-known phrase – nations are acts of “collective imagination”. National Identity is not a simple thing that can be found or lost. Its reality is much more complex than that. It is parts of a conversation that each participant can agree with or disagree with, can adapt or preserve or adopt or invent.

For example, when a Muslim teenager in London sports England colours during a football match she is not losing one discrete identity in favour of another discrete identity (a victim of Griffin’s ‘genocidal melting pot’)– no for her, this is what being British looks like. Likewise, when a white man from Dorset gets into traditional folk music, he is not discovering something called “Englishness” that he can put on whole – instead by his choices he is taking on some aspects of the conversation, rejecting others, and adapting more to his modern life, and this process is his national identity. In turn, the Dorset man and the Muslim teenager will themselves contribute to the collective conversation of what British identity looks like.

Nations and the identities that accompany them are not set in aspic.  They are ever shifting and ever changing. During the Great War, for example, men killed and died in the name of nations that their grandparents had never heard of.

The temptation is to hitch a ride with National Identity because National Identity seems to offer stability, social cohesion and purpose. It appears to offer these things because its identification seems simple and straightforward. But the reality is constant, endless uncertainty about what the National Identity is, where it came from and where it is going.

Note the ever tighter and decreasing circles of ‘who counts’, who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ when engaged in nationalistic conversation. Note the genealogies and family histories attempting to delineate exactly who is more ‘English’ or ‘Welsh’ (or whatever) than the other. Note the very real discussion of where Scottishness begins and ends in the Border country. Note the surprise, following a genetic test reported in the New Scientist, of the Yorkshiremen who could trace their English surnames back to the mid 14th c. when they were told that they all had West African genes in their family lines. There is no such thing as a discrete national identity which can be preserved unmixed from other nations.

Incidentally, the British are not alone in handwringing about their national identity. Canadians do it. Australians do it. Even the French and the Germans and the Americans do it, and they are usually the ones that our politicians look to wistfully when they talk about ‘other countries’ with a strong sense of themselves. A response to all this handwringing from the far right and others cannot be to retreat to an even more simplistic accounts of nations and their identities. This only perpetuates the problem.

Instead, a response in the face of the temptation to simplistic claims is to recognise the complex reality of what goes in to making a person a person. People’s identities are made up of many strands. The national conversation is only one of these strands. A person’s national identity is only part of who they are.  Usually, in day-to-day life, it is not even the most important aspect of who they are. Citizens of modern societies such as Britain have many important factors contributing to their identity that are not exhausted by the national. A Scot can also be an atheist, a woman, an old age pensioner and black.  A white Englishman might also be a heterosexual, a father, a feminist, a wheelchair user, and so on. At any one time one of these strands may well be more important than the other when it comes to asking a person what is most important for their identity. Amartya Sen puts it well in his book Identity and Violence: “Given our inescapably plural identities, we have to decide on the relative importance of our different associations and affiliations in any particular context.”

We only do ourselves a disservice when we assume that the ‘national’ strand is the most important aspect of our identity and coordinate our social lives accordingly by reducing what is most important about a person to one - and only one - group that they might belong to. Rather than operating in the abstract with a simplistic account of national identity, Christians would do well to engage with people as they really are, and this includes the ever-changing complexity of what it means to be a human being.

Fortunately, Christians have a word for describing a person in such a way that their individuality is preserved in all its elements without reducing their identity to any one element and without reference to any groups they might belong to. And that word is ‘neighbour’.

This brings me to my third and final suggestion for why I think forging close links with national identity is a temptation to avoid, and that it is because loving the nation often operates as a shortcut to loving the neighbour, thus bypassing what is so distinctive about the Christian duty to love.

But surely loving one’s nation, or having a strong sense of national identity is a way – perhaps the best way, to love our neighbour? The assumption often encountered is that a nation is like a big neighbourhood.  Popular literature and comment is filled with examples of conflating the two or claiming the connection. This is attractive to proponents of the ‘Christian nation’ because of course we are supposed to love our neighbours.

Nazir-Ali often talks about Christianity shaping the nation and the love of neighbour in the same breath. In a magazine interview the then Bishop was asked how he would re-write the national anthem if he could. He said what he really wanted to see was an insertion of the love of neighbour and mention of the Good Samaritan. Nazir-Ali, of course, is not alone amongst those who talk about duty to the nation and duty to ‘love thy neighbour’. When he was Prime Minister, Gordon Brown spoke of  “the virtue that reinforced neighbourliness … A belief in the duty of one to another is an essential element of nationhood in every country”. With explicit reference to drumming up support for his military adventures in Iraq and beyond, President George Bush said “If you want to serve our country, love your neighbor just like you'd like to be loved yourself.”

The natural temptation for Christians is to conflate being a good neighbour with being a good patriot or having a strong national identity – Sentamu’s “robustness” in national identity and Christian duty.

If I may put it another way, the assumption is that good patriots will make good citizens. I agree that a good neighbour will look like a good citizen.  They will be engaged. Empathetic. Aware. They will be ‘joiners’ and not ‘loners’. They will act responsibly for themselves and for those around them. Cohesion, stability, understanding – these are all undoubted civic goods but they are hard work. The rhetoric of national identity and patriotism is often ramped up when public leaders are searching for a shortcut to talk about these things.

Yet what is not so certain is that a strong sense of national identity will necessarily deliver the goods.  I have already quoted and critiqued politicians and church leaders who too quickly assume a link between national identity and social cohesion.  It is good also to look at places such as the United States of America.  Note its strong streak of personal and racial violence, materialistic inequality, libertarian isolationism and fragmented society (as detailed in studies such as Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone). It is not at all clear that the presence of widespread patriotism amongst the population easily translates into what one might like to call ‘good neighbourliness’. This country, with its aptitude for flag waving and strong national self-identity has not noticeably produced a situation where voter participation, issue awareness and civic engagement levels are much better than in European countries. Countries with a supposed ‘identity crisis’. Indeed, on many of these markers for ‘good citizenship’, the USA comes out worse.

Consider Britain. The undoubted evidence of patriotism in the BNP and other far right parties has done nothing towards fostering the values of ‘good neighbourliness’.  To be sure, a sift through the internet comment boards of these websites, as well as our more populist papers, will yield a lot of people very confident in their national identity. What it will not find is much evidence of the social cohesion, empathy and aware civic participation that our public leaders claim patriotism will foster in a good citizen.

If we must trumpet a Christian contribution to culture, then let us trumpet the invention of the neighbour. To quote Kierkegaard again: “No one in paganism loved the neighbour; no one suspected that he existed.  Therefore what paganism called love…was preference.” To talk about Christian love for the neighbour as opposed to the ‘pagan’ preference for people who look like me and sound like me is to point out how neighbour love and nation love often run in opposite directions.

A response to people who use strong national identity language and connect it to their ‘love’ for others is to hold the idea of Neighbourhood up against the idea of Nationhood. There is a critique of Nation love inherent in Neighbour love. The subversive element has been there from the start in the story of the Good Samaritan. When the Young Lawyer in Luke 10 asked Jesus his question of how to gain life in all its fullness, Jesus told him he needed to love God and he needed to love his neighbour.  The next question the young man asked was not “what does love look like?”  Instead he asked a question of how to identify the target of his love “And who is my neighbour?” The answer he got deliberately pit the relationships shared by culture, religion and ethnicity against the relationship of the neighbour.  It was not the one who shared the ethnic, cultural or religious affiliations with the poor man who was the neighbour.

My point is simple, but often overlooked, thanks in part to the too easy conflation of ‘nation love’ with ‘neighbour love’ and over familiarity with this, most clichéd of Jesus’ parables. Nationhood is not the neighbourhood write large. Instead the presence of the good neighbour stands as a social critique against the mindset of the good nationalist.

Against the ever decreasing circles of who ‘counts’ as a target of our love (“who is a Person to us”) we can suggest a gestalt shift as to how we view other people. The conversation as to who is a proper member of your nation is endless, unstable and ever-changing. The definition of your neighbour is infinitely simpler. As Kierkegaard points out, all you have to do is open the door and go out and the first person you see is your neighbour. The person whose needs you become aware of is your neighbour.

The category of ‘Neighbour’ includes all that goes in to making the person before you a Person. And that includes their nationality. But what neighbour language does is refuse to identify one strand of a person’s identity as the most important or only strand, and the one which allows us to decide whether they are a Person to us or not.

Will this solve all social problems and lead to an end of ethical political conversations? Of course not. But for Christians it helps to crystallize who, exactly, it is who ‘counts’ for us. And this is a crystallization that will not happen if we are heady with the language of nation. 

Luke Bretherton has written: “The three-fold challenge before the churches is how to utterly condemn Islamophobia and neo-fascism, challenge anti-religious rhetorics and intolerance by so-called progressives, and honour but not make an idol of the cultural heritage of Christianity. What is needed is a renewal of a broad-based politics of the common good, one that draws together all faiths and those of no faith; passionate critics and supporters of capitalism who together seek a more just and stable financial system; and radicals and reformers, both of whom are committed to the defence of a common life.”

This, to me, sounds like a description of a Church whose disciples know how to be good citizens.  And to this laudable goal I can only recommend the unsettling, creative, realistic and deeply Christian language of the good neighbour. It is the category by which we can describe people without any reference to their groups and without reducing their existence to one, overly simplistic national definition. One cannot be a good neighbour without being a good citizen - engaged, socially coherent, empathetic and aware. On the other hand, one can evidentially be a good patriot without being any of these things.

In conclusion, the appeal to national identity can act as a temptation towards triumphalism. In response to the fog of comfortable Christianised culture, the church can hold out the possibility of offence that Christ poses to everyone who faces him.  To the proponents of National Identity who claim it is the primal, obvious and essential fact of life we can respond by reminding them of the complex reality of human identity and the ever-shifting nature of the national narrative. And to those who are tempted to skate over the hard work of being a good citizen by trumping up the patriotic impulse, we can emphasise the challenge that the story of the good neighbour poses to those who would ground duty to others first and foremost in the their national affiliation.

I think the proponents of the Christian Nation are trying to hitch their cart to two horses. The Nationhood horse is bigger, stronger and faster.  In a short race it will win every time.  But it is also reckless and leads to destruction. The other horse is the Neighbourhood. It is less flashy but it is gentler. It probably won’t get any politician elected or earn much more than eye rolls if encountered in a policy document or newspaper headline - but it will treat each person as the person she really is and not primarily as a member of an abstract group.  After all it is not an insignificant detail that Jesus commanded us to love our neighbours, and not our nations.

Wednesday, 22 February 2012

Negotiating Religion in Urban Space - Conference at UCL, 7th March

I am speaking at a day conference (7th March, 11.00-6.00) organised by the UCL European Institute entitled 'Negotiating Religion in Urban Space'.


The event is part of a very interesting series which I do commend.  


Its free but you need to register.  


To book and for programme details click here.

Wednesday, 8 February 2012

Alinsky and the 'un-American' activities of Gingrich and Obama

Newt Gingrich’s remarks about Saul Alinsky have sparked a wave of interest in the infamous community organiser.  Much quoted are Gingrich’s statements from the South Carolina primaries that contrast "American exceptionalism” with “the radicalism of Saul Alinsky." His comments in the New Hampshire primaries clarify what he is getting at: “We have a President who is probably the most radical President in American history. … I think if you look at his background he is really a lot more Saul Alinsky radicalism than he is anything to do with traditional American models.  I think that makes this the most important election of modern times because eight years of Barack Obama will fundamentally change the nature of America.” 

Gingrich is echoing Glen Beck and other commentators who use the figure of Alinsky to portray the Obama administration as subversive radicals bent on destroying American decency and democracy. One quote from Beck in 2009 illustrates the tenor of these comments: ‘I could not care less who Saul Alinsky was a year ago … I just thought he was a loser from the ancient days that taught a bunch of people in the 60s how to be loser Marxists but now you had better pay attention to Saul Alinsky because they are in full effect.’

While Beck directly portrays Alinsky (and thereby Obama) as a Marxist, Gingrich takes a subtler route.  Gingrich is invoking the spectre of McCarthy and the search for un-American activities.  The implication being that in ages past Americans rooted out Marxists and other undesirable elements but now we make them President – look how bad things have got!  But the use of Alinsky to make this insinuation is not just historically inaccurate it reveals Gingrich’s profound disdain for a great American political tradition.

Despite working alongside Communists in the 1930s, Alinsky was never investigated by McCarthy or thought to be a threat by the ever-suspicious FBI.  Rather he was seen by many as an asset in combating both Communist and Fascist influences not only in America but also in Europe. For example, Cardinal Montini, who later became Pope Paul VI, when he was Archbishop of Milan was concerned about the influence of the Communists in that city.  So in 1958, through an introduction by Alinsky’s friend and confident, the Roman Catholic philosopher and founding father of Christian Democracy, Jacques Maritain, Montini brought Alinsky to Italy to help the church address the situation.

The genius of Alinsky’s approach to community organising was its broad-based character.  For Alinsky the interests of the poor were not intrinsically opposed to those of the rich.  His concern was the identification and pursuit of a genuinely common good.  Paradoxically, he used confrontational tactics to do achieve this end. 

Alinsky was equally critical of the sectarian interest group politics pursued by organized labor and business, and the identity politics pursued by religious groups and the Black Power movement, all of which denied the possibility of a common good. Through his approach he was able to draws together Clergy and Communists, blacks and whites, new migrants and established citizens, believers and non-believers, and the low paid and the well paid to form a broad-based coalition.  In the contemporary political climate that really is radical.  Yet it is a radical approach that is still practiced today by the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF), which Alinsky founded in 1940.

The Living Wage campaigns run by contemporary IAF organisers illustrate Alinsky’s politics of the common good.  They do not assume a class war between managers and workers.  Rather they locate the need for better pay and working conditions in the need for families to have enough to live on so parents are not having to work several jobs and can be back home to look after their kids, so the kids don’t seek surrogate families in gangs and so the surrounding area is a better place to live for both managers and workers.  All have a mutual interest in building up the common life of that place and pay and working conditions are intrinsically related to the strength or weakness of that common life. 

Alinsky and the IAF stand in the tradition of American populism, a tradition they share with the Tea Party. Yet it is a tradition routinely despised by Washington insiders like Gingrich.  It is a tradition that harks back to Jefferson and Jackson. It is anti-elites and opposes over-concentrations of power.  This means it can be both anti-corporate, refusing to believe that what is good for General Motors or any other conglomeration is necessarily good for America, and anti-Washington, being suspicious of technocratic, top-down solutions whether proposed by Republicans or Democrats.  It sees a place for the market and the state but also wants both the market and the state to know their place.  It combines religious and economic concerns as indicated in the excerpt from an 1895 speech by the populist Milford Howard: ‘The spirit of avarice is devouring the great heart of this nation.  The greed for gain gets such possession of men’s souls that they become demons.  They rush into the maelstrom of money-getting, and soon lose all fear of God and love for their Fellow-men.’  Not a bad analysis of the roots of the contemporary financial crisis.

Populism always confuses political and financial elites because it is simultaneously ‘conservative’ and ‘radical’.  But we can contrast its approach to the top-down solutions proposed by the likes of Gingrich and Obama.  While they are portrayed as entirely different, Gingrich’s proposed tax cuts and Obama’s proposed tax credits are both impersonal, complex, technocratic interventions designed to stimulate the economy from a bureau in Washington.  Neither reflects ‘authentic’ American traditions of self-organised, bottom up civic and economic renewal.  To see these we would do better to look at work currently undertaken by the IAF.

Gingrich and Obama both focus on the distribution of economic resources.  Where they differ is on who should have more and who should have less in order to kick-start the economy.  But neither tax cuts nor tax credits will affect the power imbalances in economic relations and the lack of accountability that was at the heart of the current financial crisis.  The IAF, and populism more generally, is concerned with the distribution of power and seeks measures that either inhibit or rebalance economic and political power so that people can act for themselves.  Instead of tax cuts or tax credits, the IAF calls for a restitution of anti-usury legislation so that there is a limit to how much trouble poor people in debt can get into and a curtailing of the power unaccountable and unelected bankers have over the lives of others.

Wednesday, 25 January 2012

Conference on Patriotism, Identity & Religious Pluralism

Faith & Public Policy Forum 


in conjunction with the Lincoln Theological Institute, KLICE, and the McDonald Centre for Theology, Ethics and Public Policy 



are hosting a conference on Sat 19th May 2012.




Friday, 30 December 2011

Is Britain a Christian nation?

David Cameron’s statement that Britain is a Christian country is both brave and wrong.  He was of course right to say that many of our morals today come from the Bible, but does that make Britain a Christian country?  He was also right to draw a contrast with France and point to how, in the contemporary context at least, Establishment makes it easier for those of others faiths to receive public recognition – a point often made by the Chief Rabbi.  But again, does legal Establishment make Britain a Christian nation? 

I think not for the reason that we must distinguish the public recognition of Christianity from saying we are a ‘Christian nation’ and thereby identifying Christianity with national identity.  The former is open to including many faiths and people of no faith as contributing to the common life of this country, each in proportion to the other, so that at the present time, it is only accurate to say that Christianity has proportionally had a bigger impact in shaping this country than say Buddhism. 

Christian customary practices such as carol singing and Christmas trees, as well as prayers in Parliament or council chambers are a legitimate part of our common life.  However, to say we are a ‘Christian nation’ is to confuse what it means to be a Christian with what it means to be British and this is to confuse the ‘nation’ for the church. 

In theological terms this confusion has a name: it’s called ‘phyletism’ and was condemned by the Synod of Constantinople in 1872 as a heresy.  What the Synod was condemning was a move whereby national identity and ecclesial identity become synonymous such that to be Greek is to be Orthodox and vice versa.  This may all seem like a matter of semantics, but to understand why careless talk costs lives we must draw a historical analogy. 

On the Continent, around the turn of the last century, the church faced an existential challenge.  On the one hand were the parties of revolution who judged themselves to represent progress and who were anti-religious.  Some Christians sided with the parties of revolution while at the same time challenging their anti-clerical and anti-religious ideologies.  Christian socialism was the offspring of this marriage.  On the other hand were the parties of reaction who sought to defend the iniquitous and unjust status quo in the name of stability and order. Most Christians aligned themselves with the parties of reaction. For some this was out of a fear of anti-religious ideologies, others feared disorder, while others identified their interests with the status quo. The economic and political tumult brought about by the Great Depression resulted in widespread support for the parties of revolution, which culminated in Communism, and for the parties of reaction, which culminated in Fascism. 

Christian Democracy as a political movement was born out of a rejection of both revolution and reaction and came to power after 1945 in Italy and Germany in the ashes of Fascism and in resistance to Communism.  Unlike the parties of revolution and reaction, post-war Christian Democratic parties, alongside Social Democratic parties, sought to be broad-based, drawing together the working and middle classes, Protestants and Catholics, socialists and capitalists.  They refused the politics of fear, hate and paranoia that Communism and Fascism thrived on and called for a politics of the common good.  It was this vision of politics that lay behind the formation of the Common Market (now the EU) by the likes of Jean Monnet.  Yet now both the EU and Christian Democratic parties are at a point of crisis.

Arguably, the European church today is faced with a parallel challenge to the one it faced at the beginning of the twentieth century.  Those who claim to represent progress adopt anti-religious rhetorics and promote tolerance for everything but religion.  While those who represent the parties of reaction are increasingly trying to co-opt Christianity as a trope for racial and national identity while demonising and scapegoating Islam and immigrants for what are economic woes brought about by a crisis in capitalism. 

In this country, the EDL and BNP do this most explicitly.  On the Continent, parties such as Front National in France, the Swiss People’s Party, and the Freedom Party in the Netherlands adopt similar tactics.  Careless talk about a ‘Christian nation’ plays into the hands of the contemporary reactionaries.

The three-fold challenge before the churches is how to utterly condemn Islamophobia and neo-fascism, challenge anti-religious rhetorics and intolerance by so-called progressives, and honour but not make an idol of the cultural heritage of Christianity.  What is needed is a renewal of a broad-based politics of the common good, one that draws together all faiths and those of no faith, passionate critics and supporters of capitalism who together seek a more just and stable financial system, and radicals and reformers in defence of a common life.  In the UK London Citizens and its work of broad-based community organising best embodies such a politics.


Also posted on the Huffington Post.

Tuesday, 20 December 2011

NEW FAITH & PUBLIC POLICY SEMINAR SERIES

Organised and hosted in an exciting new collaboration with WESTMINSTER ABBEY, the FAITH & PUBLIC POLICY FORUM is pleased to announce a forthcoming series of seminars:










Tuesday 14th Feb 2012

Title: The Churches and the Labour Movement: Future Directions & Challenges

Jon Cruddas, MP & Stephen Timms, MP will present with a response given by Dr Maurice Glasman (House of Lords/London Metropolitan University)

Jon Cruddas is Labour MP for Dagenham & Rainham, a leading left-wing figure in the Labour Party and a Roman Catholic who cites Archbishop Oscar Romero as an influence. Stephen Timms is Labour MP for East Ham who held a number of ministerial positions in the New Labour government under both Blair and Brown and who is an active Christian involved in both the Christian Socialist Movement and the Labour Party Faiths Group. Maurice Glasman is Reader in Political Theory at London Metropolitan University and a Labour Peer, as well as being the 'dean' of Blue Labour he is actively involved in the Masorti Synagogues.


Tuesday 20th March 2012

Title: The Churches and National Identity: Challenging the Far Right While Curating a Christian Heritage

Dr Stephen Backhouse, St Mellitus College. There will also be short case studies relevant to the theme from other participants.

Dr Backhouse is Tutor for Social and Political Theology at St Mellitus. He has studied at the universities of Oxford and McGill. His most recent publication is 'Kierkegaard's Critique of Christian Nationalism' (Oxford University Press, 2011).


Tuesday 24th April 2012

Title: Conflict or Consensus? Contrasting Approaches to Christian Social and Political Engagement

Dr Luke Bretherton, King's College London

Dr Bretherton is Reader in Theology & Politics and Convenor of the Faith & Public Policy at King's College London. His most recent publication is 'Christianity & Contemporary Politics: The Conditions and Possibilities of Faithful Witness (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010).  As of Autumn 2012 he will be taking up a position at the Divinity School, Duke University.


Times: 12.30-2.00

Location: Westminster Abbey.  

Numbers are limited so you must register for these events. 
To do so contact Administration, Westminister Abbey

Refreshments: lunch is being provided by the Abbey.




Alongside these seminars is the following lecture series by Lord Raymond Plant:


17 April 2012 6:15 pm Christian Faith and Public Policy: Faith, Reason and Science in the public arena


Exploring issues of faith and public policy, the first of three lectures in the Christian Faith and Public Policy series by Lord Plant will look at the issues behind the contemporary public debate on issues in Faith and Public Policy.


24 April 2012 6:15 pm Christian Faith and Public Policy: Faith, Gender and Equality


Exploring issues of faith and public policy, the second of three lectures in the Christian Faith and Public Policy series by Lord Plant will ask what happens when the claims of human rights conflict with the Church’s traditional teaching.


1 May 2012 6:15 pm Christian Faith and Public Policy: Faith and the Constitution


Exploring issues of faith and public policy, the final of three lectures in the Christian Faith and Public Policy series by Lord Plant will consider what sort of institutional role faith should play in modern society, with particular reference to the monarchy.



Raymond Plant is a Labour Peer and Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Philosophy at King's College London. Lord Plant sits in the House of Lords as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. He has written extensively on political, social, and legal philosophy, dealing with such issues as human rights and community. He is a Fellow of St Catherine's College Oxford, and Harris Manchester College Oxford.
Free. No tickets required. Open to all.
Venue: Cheyneygates, Westminster Abbey
Entrance via the Cloisters, Dean’s Yard
Cheyneygates is accessible by a long flight of stairs. Therefore, it is not suitable for anyone with restricted mobility or who requires wheelchair access.